A cartoon from The Chicago Inter Ocean on the eve of the 1913 American League meeting.
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In 1916, The Newspaper Enterprise Association ran a series of brief articles called “One Minute Talks with Ballplayers.”
Sherry Magee, Boston Braves outfielder attributed the success of his team’s pitching staff and his own .241 average to Braves Field
Sherry Magee
“No team can hit on the Boston National League grounds. The fence is so far from the plate and the slope so great from the infield to the fence that the batter can just about see the top of the fence in centerfield.
“If the fence was 20 feet higher it would be a great field for batsmen, but as it is now there is nothing but the sky for a background. There isn’t even a building in back of the wall in sight of the batter. How is a batter going to hit a brand new white ball looking into a skyline of the same color?”
“It also is almost impossible to gauge any kind of a ball as there is no background of any description.”
Magee’s .241 average in 1916 was the worst performance as a big leaguer–his only lower average was as a part-time player with the 1919 Cincinnati Reds in his final season–he ended his career with a .291 average over 16 seasons.
In 1916, The Newspaper Enterprise Association ran a series of brief articles called “One Minute Talks with Ballplayers.”
Pat Ragan talked about his Boston Braves teammate, Tom Hughes.
Pat Ragan
Hughes won just 19 games over parts of five seasons in the major leagues from 1906-1914, then, in 1915 and 1916, he won 32, including a 16-3 mark in 1916. His success was attributed to doctoring the ball.
“(Hughes) is accused of scratching the surface of the ball with his fingernails, but that’s all bunk.”
While Ragan conceded that “No pitcher likes to hurl a pure white ball, “he said that wasn’t Hughes’ secret:
Tom Hughes
“There is no kick about the way Tom pitches. He simply has mastered something new and I doubt if there are other fellows who can do with knuckle clutch pitch what he can. He pitches it as a knuckleball partly overhand and partly side arm.
“The great wiggle it takes or the quick break is due to the way he delivers it and the number of fingers he uses when he throws the ball.”
After his two seasons as a 16-game winner, Hughes was hampered by arm injuries and won just five more games in 1917 and 1918.
After explaining some of Frank Chance’s best virtues in a 1910 article in The Chicago Herald, Johnny Evers got down to explaining why he felt his manager was superior to the manager of the Cubs’ World Series opponent:
Johnny Evers
“Connie Mack, and my information comes from men in the American League, directs the play of his team by a series of signals given from the bench.
“We will say, for instance, that a Philadelphia player reaches first. From that moment he has two things to do. First, he must watch the pitcher. And with a man like (Mordecai) Brown on the slab, this alone is sufficient to keep a man busy. In addition to this, he must also watch Connie Mack, who, by a signal, given with a scorecard, by the crossing of his legs or something of the sort, tells him that he must steal on the next ball, that the hit and run will be tried, or signals some other play. That method keeps the base runner’s attention divided between the bench and the pitcher. He dares not take his eyes off of either.
“With Chance it is different. He has his signals so perfected that all the base runner must do is to watch the man following.
Frank Chance
“Say that Cub player reaches first. When the next batter goes to the plate he has been instructed as to what is expected of him and also what is expected of the base runner.
“And it becomes his duty to signal the man on the bases concerning his duty.
“Maybe Chance has told the man going up to try the hit and run on the second ball. The batter slips the signal to the man on the base…And since (the batter) and the pitcher are on a line, you can see that the whole process is simplified.”
Evers said Chance’s system was better because “it makes it all the more difficult” for opponents to steal signs.
He said his manager was also not rigid in his orders, which “won him the enduring friendship of his men.” And Chance rarely sent players to the plate “with ironclad instruction.”
Evers said:
“He tells you to do the unexpected, and that if you believe you can catch the enemy unawares to do it. That is the reason that the Cubs ‘pull off’ plays.”
Evers said of managers in general:
“I have played under the playing manager and under the man who manages from the bench, and I can’t for the life of me see where the latter is nearly as effective as the playing leader.
“(Frank) Selee was a bench manager and a good one in his prime. Yet he was never part of the play as Chance is, and the reason was because he was not on the field. Even after the ball is hit the playing manager has an opportunity of instructing his players.
“He can tell where to make the play. It’s utterly impossible for a bench manager to do this. Again, the playing manager at a critical stage of the game, and especially if he is playing an infield position, as Chance does, can issue instructions to the pitcher, telling him what and where to pitch. He can do this in a natural manner and without attracting the attention of the crowd.”
Evers noted that for Mack to do the same:
Connie Mack
“(H)e would have to stop the game and send some player to the diamond. That procedure never did any pitcher any good.
“Say that there is a man on second or third and that a dangerous man is up. I have heard Chance tell the pitcher to make the batter hit a bad one, and if the man at the plate refused that it would be alright if he was passed. Mack could not do this. It would be too complicated for signals. About all he could do would be to signal the pitcher to pass the man.
“Connie Mack may have excellent judgment in the selection of his pitchers and in appraising the value of his men, but I am confident that he has nothing on Manager Chance in this department of the game.
“The Chicago man is adept at picking the man who is ‘right.’ Time and again I have known the fellows to pick a certain man to pitch and Chance would select some other. But he usually picked the right one, and there is absolutely no doubt in my mind but that he will pick the right ones in the big series.”
The bench manager beat the playing manager in the 1910 series; Mack and the Athletics beat Chance and the Cubs four games to one.
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